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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
IN LICENSING FOREIGN AIR CARRIERSI
By

WHITNEY GILLILLANDtt

The international air route structure which serves the free world has
been developed largely under a series of bilateral agreements between
nations. The United States has more than fifty. They deal with many
subjects including access, law of the contract, airport charges, capacity,
rates, disputes, and termination. All of these relate to an exchange of
routes. My comments will be directed primarily to the route grants, and
the steps required to implement them.
Fundamental in the United States conception of international air routes,
and of bilateral agreements, is the view that once operating authority has
been granted, a carrier shall have reasonable opportunity to develop a
route, and will not be subject to unilateral limitations of frequencies or
capacity. Consequently, the exchange set forth in a bilateral and the
subsequent procedures concerning operating permission are regarded as
matters of much importance. It is by these two steps that a balance of
rights is to be achieved and tested-not by later steps unspecified in the
bilateral.
Although negotiation of agreements is carried on under the leadership
of the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics Board, whose functions
are primarily economic, has an equally important duty. This is so because
the Declaration of Policy of the Federal Aviation Act requires the Board
to consider, as in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity, the development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign commerce of the United
States.! Another section requires the Secretary of State to consult with the
Board concerning negotiations. Still another section provides that no
foreign air carrier shall engage in air transportation to and from the
United States, unless there is in force a permit issued by the Board.' A
fourth section imposes similar requirements on United States carriers.'
t Address presented at the Third Interamerican Law Conference, University of Miami Law
Center, Coral Gables, Florida, 22-24 March 1966.
tt Member, Civil Aeronautics Board.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964). For the
complete text of the act (as amended through July 1963) and related statutes, see CAB, AERONAUTICAL

STATUTES

'Federal
'Federal
'Federal
U.S.C. 1371

AND RELATED MATERIALS

(1963).

Aviation Act of 1958, § 802, 72 Stat. 713, 49 U.S.C. 5 1462 (1964).
Aviation Act of 1958, 5 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. 5 1372 (1964).
Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 76 Stat. 143
(1964).

(1962),

49
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Accordingly, it is the custom for the Board to subject the international
route structure to constant study. When negotiations are in the offing,
it is the practice to consult carefully with the United States carriers whose
operations may be affected, and to prepare and submit a report, together
with recommendations, to the Department of State. It is also the custom
to take part in the negotiations. An agreement, when consummated, is not
self-operating and a carrier which aspires to serve a route has further steps
to take. First it must seek and obtain from its own government a designation to serve the route. This is required by the bilateral.' Then it must
seek and obtain from the other government permission to operate the
route4
The complexity of procedures varies between nations and the requirements of each should be borne in mind in the course of negotiations.
Ours are complex and sometimes cause misunderstandings to applicants.
Unless understood they may also cause us embarrassment, particularly in
cases where reciprocal applications have been quickly granted. However,
the United States procedures place no burden upon foreign carriers to
which United States carriers are not subjected, for the latter generally
face much greater tests upon their applications to the Board for certificates
of public convenience and necessity, and upon which their designations
to foreign governments are founded. The United States procedures must
be evaluated in the light of the deeply entrenched habit of mind prevalent
in this country which calls for uniformity, for public hearings, and for
full and adequate opportunity to be heard in cases where private rights
may be affected by administrative action. This has been the state of affairs
since colonial times and has been manifested throughout our governmental
structure. It accounts for the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires uniform and impartial procedures of all administrative agencies,7
and for the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act with which we are
concerned. Thus, public adversary hearings are readily to be expected on
questions which are reserved under a bilateral for the grantor government's
determination! Furthermore, there is no means to publicly come to grips
with the terms in advance of execution. Accordingly, hearings serve a
purpose as an accounting for stewardship.
The procedural steps are in brief as follows.! The application for a
foreign air carrier permit is filed with the Board through diplomatic
channels and public notice of its filing is given. The matter is then set
for a public hearing before one of the Board's hearing examiners. The
proceeding is conducted in much the same fashion as a case is tried in one
of the ordinary civil courts. The great bulk of the cases are not contested
and, at the conclusion of the hearing, a recommended decision is issued
'Air Transport Agreement With Great Britain, II Feb. 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507
[Bermuda Agreement]; British Overseas Airways Corp., Foreign Permit Amendment, 29 C.A.B.
583, 585 n.2 (1959).
e Ibid.
760 Stat. 237 (1946),
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
'Bermuda Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 2 & 6.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1964).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 32

by the examiner. In these instances no exceptions are filed and the case is
submitted immediately to the Board for its consideration. There are,
however, cases in which United States domestic carriers intervene, and
vigorously contest some or all of the authority sought by the foreign air
carrier. In such cases, the evidence is frequently voluminous and the length
of time to assimilate it is considerable. When that has been done, the hearing examiner issues a recommended decision which may be subject to exceptions and briefs to the Board. Thereafter the Board considers the recommended decision, may hold oral argument, and either adopts it or prepares
one of its own.
The decision does not issue at this point however. Unlike the United
States carrier domestic route certificate cases, but like the United States
carrier foreign route certificate cases, the Board's decision is not final until
it has been reviewed by the President." The President may require a revision in any respect, and may seek the advice of the Departments of
State or Commerce, or of any other departments or agencies. Thus, although his views are articulated by the Board, he is in effect the final
determinor of the matter. The decision is not subject to review in the
courts." The issues considered by the Board in such a case are these:
(1) Is the applicant carrier fit, willing, and able to properly perform
such air transportation and to conform to the provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board
thereunder, and
(2) Will the proposed transportation be in the public interest?"
The Board is not limited in its decisions to acceptance or rejection of an
application but may prescribe the duration of any permit and may attach
to it such reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations as, in its judgment,
the public interest may require."
In actual practice the issues seldom prove formidable. The vast majority
of cases are of a pro forma, perfunctory nature, merely providing the
mechanical means for making the record upon which the Board can base
its statutory findings. The time involved is determined mostly by the procedural requirements, and is infrequently prolonged by the complexity
of the issues.
It is not surprising, however, that in some cases a United States carrier,
perceiving its economic status to be threatened by new route competition
without compensating advantages, and accustomed to slugging it out
vigorously against competitors in domestic route cases, albeit with greater
chances of success, should resist foreign carrier applications with much
energy.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 801, 72 Stat. 782, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
"1Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006, 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 74 Stat. 255 (1960),
75 Stat. 497 (1961), 49 U.S.C. 1486 (1964). Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103 (1948); Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965). See also Calkins, Acquisition of Operating Authority by Foreign
Air Carriers: The Role of the CAB, White House, and Department of State, 31 J. AIR L. & COM.
65 (1965).
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. S 1372 (1964).
"aIbid.
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For a long time the Board has been troubled by the question as to when,
if at all, a foreign carrier permit application, authorized under a bilateral,
is to be denied on public interest grounds. The Board's examiners have in
fact recommended such denials in a few cases. The question arises very
largely because of language in the Declaration of Policy of the act14
which lists several specific criteria, primarily economic, and directs the
Board to take them into consideration "among other things" in:
(1) determining the "public convenience and necessity," which it is
required to do in United States air carrier "certificate" cases,1 and
(2) determining the "public interest," which it is required to do in
foreign air carrier "permit" cases.'
It appears on the face of it that the issues may be largely the same. However, such an interpretation must be examined in the light of the bilateral,
and also of section 1102 of the act, which requires the Board to perform
its powers and duties consistently with any obligation assumed by the
United States in any agreement that may be in force between the United
States and any foreign country.'
The Board has long recognized that where an outstanding bilateral
agreement provides for the routes in question, it is normally in the public
interest to grant the permit unless sufficient reasons are shown that such
grant would be contrary to the public interest. Thus, the existence of the
bilateral agreement and the designation of a carrier thereunder constitute
highly significant evidence bearing on the public interest which, except
in extraordinary circumstances, lies with the faithful adherence to our
international agreements. 8 In its brief to the court in the recent Pan
American-Grace Airways (re Lufthansa) case the Board stated: The existence of a bilateral agreement is a "prima facie public interest factor pointing to the grant."" Accordingly, I believe it can be regarded as established:
"4Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1302 (1964):
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Board
shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and
in accordance with public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and
foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an airtransportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 76 Stat. 143 (1962),
49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964).
'6Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1964).
'"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1102, 72 Stat. 797, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1964).
SLufthansa German Airlines, CAB Order No. E-22851 (22 Sept. 1965); Eagle Airways
(Bahamas) Ltd., 33 C.A.B. 222 (1960); British Overseas Airways Corp., Foreign Permit Amendment, 29 C.A.B. 583 (1959).
"'Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, supra note 11.
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(1) That a bilateral makes a prima facie case on the public interest question, and (2) It will prevail in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
What constitutes extraordinary circumstances is less clear. That the burden
is heavy, and the extraordinary circumstances truly extraordinary, is
demonstrated by the fact that although there have been a large number of
cases, no route right granted under a bilateral agreement has ever been
denied by the Board on public interest grounds. However, neither the
fact situations reviewed in the cases nor the language of them are devoid
of some indication of bench marks.
A good illustration is to be found in the British Overseas Airways Corp.
case decided in 1959.20 In that case BOAC sought an amendment to its

permit, pursuant to a bilateral and the United Kingdom's designation, to
extend its London-New York-San Francisco services, via Honolulu and
Tokyo, to Hong Kong. Northwest Airlines, already serving the Pacific but
suffering under poor load factors, objected to the grant of Tokyo on the
ground that "even if called for by the bilateral agreement" it "would nonetheless be contrary to the public interest," and contended "that the public
benefits normally flowing from adherence to an international obligation"
were "outweighed by its estimate of 1960 BOAC diversion from United
States carriers." 2' Northwest estimated diversion from Pan American and
Northwest at $12,712,000 or twenty-five per cent.22 The Board's estimates,
although lower, were substantial. 3 The Board among other things said:
Stripped to its bare essentials, this proceeding presents the question whether
estimated diversion of $7.8 million ... should cause us to override our ...
agreement . . . to grant . . .a . . .route including Tokyo .... The estab-

lishment by bilateral agreement of a sound intercontinental route system for
U.S.-flag carriers necessarily involves the grant of reciprocal air routes to
carriers of other nations, with attendant diversionary consequences, and
cannot be overthrown merely by showing that burdens as well as benefits
flow from the bargain. If an affected U. S. carrier demonstrated that the
economical consequences of a route exchange would be disastrous to its system, or that the basic agreement was improvident, then the Board might
take the necessary steps to recommend renunciation of the bilateral. No such
case, however, has been presented here ....

."

(Emphasis supplied).

One member of the Board, concurring in the result, expressed the
view that:
In my reading, that section [1102] clearly intends that a bilateral agreement shall settle the public interest aspect . . . and I believe therefore that

in such a case there is no real issue of public interest to be tried by the Board.2

He can hardly be correct in this for, as the chairman pointed out in another, separate statement, the statute requires consideration of the question."
20British Overseas Airways Corp., Foreign Permit Amendment, supra note 5.

11Id. at 586.
22 Id. at 609.
23
Id. at 590, n.17.
24
id.at 592.
2 Id. at 595 (Louis J. Hector, concurring in result).
26Id. at 594 (concurring opinion of James R. Durfee).
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Consideration, however, does not necessarily require examination on

the formal hearing, and unless someone is prepared to show truly extraordinary circumstances there may be little gained by going into it. Of

course, if one of the parties in good faith wishes to undertake the task
of showing the bilateral to be so out of balance that immediate revision is
called for, it is entitled to be heard. As Judge Carl McGowan put it in
similar context:
This all seems to me to say that one who hopes to persuade the Board to
recommend to the President the denial of a foreign air carrier permit contemplated by an executive agreement has something of an uphill road. But
the way is there if he can make it ....27

Seldom are judges afforded opportunity to comment on this subject,
but such a situation did arise in the Pan American-Grace Airways case

referred to, involving a permit application of Lufthansa, which reached
the Court of Appeals on procedural questions. The court in part said:
Petitioners contend that the criteria set forth in Section 102 of "public
interest," pertinent to foreign air carrier applications . . . compels the Board
to consider the same factors as are involved in determining the "public convenience and necessity" applicable to a domestic carrier .... But the public
interest has many facets. Under Section 102 . . . the Board may consider
other criteria than those therein specifically mentioned, and Section 1102
directs the Board to act consistently with obligations assumed by the United
States in bilateral agreements. We cannot carry the use of phraseology of
similar character in the two sections to the point of overcoming the fact
that the public interest involved in our obligations under the bilateral Agreement cannot be equated with the public convenience and necessity referred
to . ... 28

It is probable that precise definitions pointing unerringly to the answer
in all situations can never be stated. Nevertheless, these two cases, BOAC
by the Board and Pan American-Grace (re Lufthansa) by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have gone a long way to
clarify the matter and to assist the Board in its future determinations.
The Board's activities in the field of foreign air carrier licensing are
certainly one of its most important functions. As I have shown, its statu-

tory promotional duties require it to take a leading part in developing an
adequate international system and in the negotiation of bilateral agreements. Its statutory licensing duties require it to process the air route
applications of foreign carriers in adversary proceedings fairly and impartially. Although the procedures may be complex they are thorough, are
carried through with reasonable expedition, guard against mistakes, and

insure the public interest.

Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, supra note 1I, at 913.
" Id. at 908.
2

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT ON A PROPOSED
TREATY ON THE MOON AND CELESTIAL BODIESI
The following statement by the President of the United States was released at San Antonio, Texas, on 7 May 1966:
Just as the United States is striving to help achieve peace on earth, we
want to do what we can to insure that explorations on the moon and
other celestial bodies will be for peaceful purposes only. We want to be
sure that our Astronauts and those of other nations can freely conduct
scientific investigations of the moon. We want the results of these activities to be available for all mankind.
We want to take action now to attain these goals. In my view, we need
a treaty laying down rules and procedures for the exploration of celestial
bodies. The essential elements of such a treaty would be as follows:
The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and
use by all countries. No country should be permitted to advance a claim
of sovereignty.
There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries
should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies.
Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination.
Astronauts of one country should give any necessary help to Astronauts
of another country.
No country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction

on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden.
I am convinced that we should do what we can-not only for our generation, but for future generations-to see to it that serious political conflicts do not arise as a result of space activities. I believe that the time is

ripe for action. We should not lose time.
I am asking Ambassador Goldberg, in New York, to seek early discussions of such a treaty in the appropriate United Nations body.

t Official White House Press Release, News Conference No. 436-A, Saturday, 7 May 1966, at
San Antonio, Texas.

THE WARSAW CONVENTIONRECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE UNITED STATES DENUNCIATION
On 14 May 1966, the United States withdrew its denunciation' of the
Warsaw Convention." The denunciation, which had been deposited with
the Polish government on 15 November 1965, was to have been effective
15 May 1966. The following three documents, furnished to the Journal
through the gracious assistance of State Department Legal Adviser Leonard
C. Meeker, give a summary of the events leading up to the withdrawal
plus the text of the withdrawal itself. Essentially, the United States withdrew the denunciation after the world's major international carriersagreed
to a tariff provision allowing $75,000 maximum damages, based upon
strict liability.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
5 May 1966
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTION
CONCERNING THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, generally known as the Warsaw Convention, was negotiated
in 1929 and is today one of the principal multilateral agreements applicable to
international air transportation. It establishes uniformity of documentation and
creates a uniform body of law with regard to the rights and responsibilities of
passengers, shippers, and air carriers in international air transportation. In addition,
its application has had the effect of making it unnecessary for the courts of the
United States to decide many difficult and unsettled international conflicts of
law issues. On the other hand, in cases of injury or death to passengers, the Convention limits the liability of air lines to only $8,300.
The Convention came into force on 13 February 1933. The United States joined
the Convention in 1934. Eventually, over ninety countries became parties to the
Convention.
In September 1955, following several preparatory international meetings under
the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and as
a result primarily of United States dissatisfaction with the low limits of liability,
a diplomatic conference was called to amend the Warsaw Convention. The conference, held at The Hague, resulted in a Protocol that amended the Warsaw
Convention in several respects. But despite urging by the United States to reach
agreement on a higher limit, the conference agreed to increase the limit only to
See Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291
(1965) for a discussion of the events leading up to the denunciation.
a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1934).
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$16,600. The Protocol was transmitted to the Senate on 24 July 1959, but was
not acted upon.
In the summer of 1961, the Administration undertook a broad study of the
relationship of the United States to the Warsaw Convenion and the Hague
Protocol. The Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA), which is
composed of representatives of agencies and departments of the Government
having an interest in international aviation affairs, was given the task of studying
the problem and making appropriate recommendations. Between the summer of
1961 and 1964, the IGIA conducted an intensive review in consultation with
interested industry and public representatives. In addition, public hearings were
held and the views of all interested parties were invited at several different stages
of the study. After full consideration, the IGIA made two basic and related
recommendations to the Secretary of State: first, that efforts be continued to
ratify The Hague Protocol, and, second, that this be coupled with complementary
legislation providing for automatic compulsory insurance in the amount of
$50,000. Together with The Hague Protocol limit of $16,600, this would have
permitted a maximum recovery of $66,600.
On 7 August 1964, the legislation and the recommendation to ratify The
Hague Protocol were transmitted to the Congress. The 88th Congress did not
act on the legislation or the Protocol and the package proposal was resubmitted,
without change, on 30 April 1965.
On 26-27 May 1965, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings
on the Protocol. Ten witnesses appeared. FAA Administrator Najeeb E. Halaby
and Leonard C. Meeker, the State Department's Legal Adviser, supported ratification of the Protocol and enactment of the automatic insurance legislation. Five
attorneys, specializing in the representation of claimants in aviation accident cases,
opposed both ratification of the Protocol and enactment of the insurance legislation. The Air Transport Association (ATA), representing the United States
domestic and international carriers, supported ratification of the Protocol and
the $16,600 limit but opposed the insurance legislation.
The Foreign Relations Committee issued its report on 29 June 1965. The report
indicated that "the Warsaw Convention establishes uniform rules as to the rights
and obligations between air carriers and users of international transportation, and
creates uniformity with respect to transportation documents required." The report
noted, however, that "even the $16,600 limitation of liability provided for in
The Hague Protocol is highly inadequate by United States standards" but that
together with the complementary insurance legislation, maximum recoveries could
be had of $66,600. On this basis, the Committee recommended ratification of the
Protocol but added that if the legislation "is not enacted within a reasonable time
(i.e., prior to the adjournment of the 89th Congress), the Department of State
should take immediate steps to denounce the Warsaw Convention and The Hague
Protocol."
When Congress failed to take action on the compulsory insurance legislation,
the Administration, like the Foreign Relations Committee, concluded that The
Hague Protocol alone would not afford adequate protection to the American
traveling public. If no supplementary protection could be made available, then
withdrawal from the Convention and reliance on the common law would afford
the best measure of protection. In search of a supplementary measure that would
provide a satisfactory alternative to withdrawal from the Convention, the Administration suggested that the United States carriers voluntarily increase their
limits of liability to $100,000. Such voluntary action is permitted under Article
22 of the Convention. After several meetings and conversations, it became apparent
that some carriers were prepared to agree on a limit of $50,000 but no carrier was
prepared to go as high as the $100,000 limit suggested by the Government.
Moreover, some carriers would not agree on any amount unless the amount was
also agreed upon by the principal foreign international carriers.

1966]

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

Following further consideration by the IGIA, it was decided that the United
States should deposit a notice of termination of the Warsaw Convention on 15
November 1965. Article 39 of the Convention specifically permits such action
by any state party to the Convention and provides that termination takes effect
six months after deposit of the notice.
The United States deposited its notice on 15 November, to be effective 15
May 1966. At the time the notice was deposited, however, the United States
indicated that it would be prepared to withdraw the notice if two conditions
were present: first, that the results of an ICAO international conference, which
was then scheduled for 1 February 1966, showed that there was a reasonable
prospect for a new convention with a limit of $100,000; and, second, that pending
the effectiveness of such a new convention (which could take several years), the
principal international carriers could work out an interim agreement, consistent
with Article 22 of the Convention, for a limit of liability of $75,000.
The ICAO international conference was held, as scheduled, in Montreal, Canada,
1-15 February 1966. The conference was attended by representatives of sixtyone states. A majority of the countries were prepared to agree on limits of $ 50,000,
although several indicated that in their countries, $33,000 and, in some cases,
even $16,600 would be more than adequate. Some countries, primarily Western
European, were prepared to go as high as $75,000 in order to avoid United States
denunciation, but there was no support for the United States proposal, set forth
at the time of the 15 November notice, of a limit of $100,000. Despite more
than two weeks of discussion and debate, no agreement was reached on an acceptable limit.
Following the conference, the United States Government was asked by Sir
William Hildred, then Director General of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), whether his Association could make an effort to arrive at an
interim carrier arrangement that would be acceptable to the United States and
permit the United States to withdraw its notice of termination. Hildred's suggested arrangement was similar to a proposal that had been made by the Swedish
government, and supported by other governments, during the Montreal conference.
The proposal provided for limits of liability of $75,000 and absolute liability on
the part of the carriers.
In essence, absolute liability in this context means that a claimant would not
be required to prove fault on the part of the carrier, but only the amount of his
damages. Claimant would be able to recover the amount of his provable damages,
though subject to a maximum limitation of $75,000. Should the claimant, under
Article 25 of the Convention, attempt to prove wilful misconduct on the part of
the carrier, the question of fault would of course be in issue. In such a case,
should the claimant succeed in proving wilful misconduct, he would be subject
to no limitation on his recovery. In addition, as presently provided in Article 21
of the Convention, contributory negligence on the part of the claimant would
continue to be a bar to his recovery or to any recovery on his behalf.
With absolute liability, nearly every injured person will receive compensation.
In most cases, it is expected that the amount will be fixed between the airline
or insurance company and the claimant without need for litigation. The persons
who need compensation the most urgently-i.e., survivors of average or below
average income earners-will receive their compensation when the need is greatest,
without the risks and delays of accident investigation and litigation.
On 8 April 1966, the United States Government replied to IATA indicating
that in order for such an arrangement to be acceptable, it would have to include
twenty-four specified foreign carriers plus thirteen United States scheduled carriers
and six United States non-scheduled carriers. We further stated that although
the decision to terminate had been made and would be difficult to change at this
late hour, we would try to do so if the IATA efforts were successful.
3

For the text of the denunciation, see 31 J.

AIR

L. & CoM. 303 (1965).
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By 29 April, IATA informed the United States Government that it had obtained
the agreement of all the foreign carriers specified by the United States Government
except for two Mexican carriers and Air India, who were still undecided. According to a recent report from IATA, seventeen other foreign airlines, not specified
by the United States, have also indicated their willingness to participate in the
arrangement. Among United States carriers, the majority, including all the major
international carriers, have agreed. Five primary domestic carriers (United, National, Delta, Northeast, and Western) and two supplemental carriers (TIA and
World) have thus far not agreed. If the arrangement goes into effect, we anticipate
that these seven carriers will eventually agree.
After careful consideration of the results of the IATA effort by all the interested agencies, it was decided that the United States Government could withdraw
its notice if, but only if, three conditions were met prior to Friday, 13 May.
These conditions are as follows:
(a) The contract provisions for the arrangement, including provisions for
adequate notice to the public, can be worked out with IATA.
(b) The arrangement is filed with the CAB (and, where required, with other
governments) by all carriers operating to or from the United States.
(c) The Governments whose carriers operate to or from the United States give
assurances to the United States Government that they accept, or at least will not
object to, the arrangement and that, in any event, they will permit the arrangement to remain in effect indefinitely, subject to termination only on twelve
months' notice.
If these three conditions can be met and if the United States should withdraw
its notice of termination, the effect will be to increase the limits of liability from
$8,300 to $75,000. In addition, the claimant will not be required to establish
fault on the part of the carrier in order to be assured of a recovery. Finally, the
arrangement will be applicable to all international journeys that originate or
terminate or have an agreed stopping place in the United States. The United
States Government cannot reach a final decision on whether to withdraw the
notice of 15 November until it is assured that the three conditions have been met
and that, as of 16 May 1966, an arrangement will go into effect guaranteeing the
broadest possible protection for the United States traveling public.
In addition, it should be emphasized that the arrangement, if accepted, will be
in effect for an interim period only. It will be the subject of a diplomatic conference at some future date, at which time appropriate modifications to the arrangement can be made. Prior to the conference, all interested parties will be invited to
present their views on all aspects of the issue. If the diplomatic conference reaches
agreement on a new convention, that convention will be submitted for the
advice and consent of the Senate, at which time public hearings will again be held.
The United States Government is presently awaiting the outcome of its efforts
to ascertain whether the three conditions can be met that will assure adequate
and just recoveries to United States citizens in the event of international aviation
accidents.
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Department of State Press Release No. 110
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The Department of State, in consultation and with the concurrence of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense, has concluded that the interests of the
United States traveling public and of international civil aviation would be best
served by continuing within the framework of the Warsaw Convention under a
plan the essential features of which are:
First. The limits of international carrier liability for passengers will be increased
from $8,300 to $75,000 per person. Those travelers who wish to carry greater
protection will be free to take out additional insurance to cover their needs.
There will be no limit on liability where the carrier is guilty of wilful misconduct.
Second. Airlines in international travel will be absolutely liable up to $75,000
per passenger regardless of any fault or negligence. Recovery by those who need
it most will thus be maximized and expedited. Long and costly lawsuits will be
unnecessary in many cases.
Third. International airlines carrying well over ninety percent of Americans in
international travel are participating in the plan. The recommendation of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that no airline operating within the United
States remain outside the plan has been substantially complied with. Those United
States airlines which initially declined to come within the plan have now indicated their agreement to accepting an increase in liability from $8,300 to $75,000.
Fourth. This is an interim arrangement terminable on twelve months' notice.
In the months ahead public hearings will be held for the purpose of determining
the definitive United States position in preparation for further international discussions concerning the Warsaw Convention.
Fifth. The international carriers who have notified the Civil Aeronautics Board
of their acceptance of the interim arrangements are: Aeronaves, Air Canada, Air
France, Air India, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, BEA, BOAC, Canadian Pacific, CMA,
El Al, Icelandic, Iberia, Japan Air Lines, KLM, Lufthansa, Olympic, Philippine
Airlines, Qantas, Sabena, SAS, Swissair, Varig, and VIASA; American, Braniff,
Continental, Eastern, Northeast, Northwest, Pan American, Panagra, TWA, and
Western. The following United States airlines mainly engaged in domestic carriage
which have accepted the increased limits of liability but not the feature of absolute
liability are: Delta, National, and United. It is expected that other carriers will
join the plan.
Sixth. Those guilty of sabotage and persons claiming on their behalf will not
be entitled to recover any damages.
By acceptance of the plan the United States and all of the other participating
countries have assured the continuation of the uniform system of law governing
airlines, shippers and passengers and have demonstrated again the viability of the
system of international cooperation in civil aviation and in international law.
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Department of State Press Release No. 111
14 May 1966
In accordance with the decision announced yesterday, the United States Government today formally withdrew its notification of termination of adherence to
the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. The withdrawal took the form of a note delivered
by the United States Embassy in Warsaw to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
at 11:00 A.M. today local time.
The text of the note is as follows:
Excellency,
I have the honor, on instructions from my Government, to give formal
notification to the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the withdrawal by the United States of America of the notice of denunciation submitted on November 15, 1965, of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air and the Additional Protocol relating thereto signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929.
At the time the notice under Article 39 was submitted, the United States
Government stated that that action was taken solely because of dissatisfaction
with the low limits of liability for death or personal injury provided in the
Convention, even as those limits would be increased by the Protocol to amend
the Convention done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. Since that time,
intensive negotiations among carriers and among governments have succeeded
in establishing a new interim arrangement in accordance with Article 22 (1)
of the Convention, whereby participating carriers have agreed, in cases of
the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, to limits of
liability of $75,000 per passenger inclusive of legal fees and costs (or $58,000
exclusive of legal fees and costs in case of a claim brought in a State where
provision is made for separate award of legal fees and costs) and have agreed
not to avail themselves in any such cases of any defense under Article 20 (1)
of the Convention, or the Convention as amended by The Hague Protocol.
This arrangement is applicable to all international transportation by the
carrier as defined in the Convention or the Convention as amended by The
Hague Protocol which according to the contract of carriage includes a point
in the United States of America as a point of origin, point of destination, or
agreed stopping place.
In view of the acceptance of this arrangement by the great majority of
the world's international airlines, including all principal carriers serving the
United States, the conditions which led the United States to serve its notice
of November 15 have substantially changed. Accordingly, the United States
of America believes that its continuing objectives of uniformity of international law and adequate protection for international air travelers will best
be assured within the framework of the Warsaw Convention. The United
States of America looks forward to participation by all carriers and governments in the provisional arrangement described above and to its acceptance
on a world-wide basis. Further, the Government of the United States looks
forward to continued discussions looking to an up-to-date and permanent
international agreement on the important issues dealt with in the Warsaw
Convention.
My Government would appreciate it if the Government of the Polish
People's Republic would inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention of this notification.

